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Silicon Valley Bank

Research entry · not admitted

Silicon Valley Bank: transaction loss, unrealized valuation measures and dated resolution estimates.

Silicon Valley Bank’s March 8, 2023 sale of available-for-sale securities produced an approximately $1.8 billion after-tax loss, according to SVB Financial Group’s later transaction filing. The holding company’s preceding annual report describes a different measure: a $15.152 billion gap between the consolidated held-to-maturity portfolio’s net carrying value and fair value at December 31, 2022. Its investment note separately reports $15.160 billion in gross unrealized losses. Those amounts have different accounting meanings and do not describe one universal loss.

The Federal Reserve’s May 2023 Financial Stability Report also distinguishes $42 billion withdrawn on March 9 from $100 billion in withdrawals scheduled or expected for the following day. This research dossier keeps transactions, valuations, outflows and later resolution estimates attached to their entities, dates and documentary roles. It preserves disagreements and missing source representations instead of adding unlike quantities or presenting an estimated cost as final.

Scope

Silicon Valley Bank (Santa Clara, California; state-chartered member bank; subsidiary of SVB Financial Group), from its year-end 2022 disclosures through its closure on 10 March 2023, the systemic risk determination of 12 March 2023, the sale of Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. to First-Citizens Bank & Trust on 26–27 March 2023, the official reviews of April to September 2023, and the Deposit Insurance Fund cost estimates and special assessment through 2025.

This dossier is not an account of Signature Bank or First Republic Bank except where a shared document covers them, a history of the bank before 2022, an account of SVB Financial Group's Chapter 11 case, or an assessment of the 2018 tailoring law as policy.

Key distinctions

  1. "SVB lost $1.8 billion" names one transaction, not the failure. The $1.8 billion is the after-tax loss on the 8 March sale of an AFS portfolio with book value of about $23.97 billion for net proceeds of about $21.45 billion (S03). It is not the DIF cost or the unrealized HTM difference. The transaction filing does not establish a universal absence of depositor losses; the protection announced on 12 March has its own scope in S06.
  2. "Unrealized losses" and "losses" are different accounting facts. At 31 December 2022 SVB Financial Group's consolidated HTM portfolio had a net carrying value of $91.321 billion, after a $6 million credit-loss allowance, against a fair value of $76.169 billion: a difference of $15.152 billion, about $15.2 billion (S02, consolidated balance sheet, printed p. 95). The investment note separately reports $91.327 billion gross amortized cost and $15.160 billion gross unrealized losses (printed p. 125); these are different measures. Subtracting the rounded $91.3 and $76.2 gives $15.1 and is the wrong way to state the figure. Unrealized means not yet recognized in income; it is neither hidden nor realized.
  3. "Insolvent" and "illiquid" are both in the record, and they are not the same. The prior parallel review reported that DFPI's order cited inadequate liquidity and insolvency (S04); the order ties the insolvency finding to the bank's inability to meet its obligations after the run and separately describes its preceding financial condition (prior reading only; the order remains unretained in this pull, so VERIFY the exact wording against that body). The regulator's word "insolvent" is its own finding on its own basis; it does not by itself establish negative year-end GAAP equity or a complete mark-to-market valuation (S16 is interpretation, not record).
  4. "$42 billion" is a one-day deposit outflow, not a total. The Federal Reserve's May 2023 Financial Stability Report reports $42 billion withdrawn on 9 March and $100 billion in withdrawals scheduled or expected for 10 March, which the bank could not pay (S09, related report). Barr's retained 28 March prepared statement instead reports more than $40 billion withdrawn on 9 March and even greater outflows expected the next day. The scheduled or expected amount must not be added to completed withdrawals. The earlier review reports the DFPI order's wording as withdrawals being "initiated" (S04; VERIFY against its still-unretained body). Render each statement with its own record and precision. The prior inventory reports FDIC figures of $175.4 billion in deposits at December 31, 2022 (S05) and attribute about $119 billion to March 10 in the later bridge-bank announcement (S07); First Citizens assumed about $56.5 billion (S08). S05/S07 FDIC releases remain unretained here; their prior-reading figures are not certified from those missing bodies. S08 is a separate retained company filing. Each figure has a date and an entity.
  5. "Depositors were bailed out by taxpayers" compresses three different mechanisms. Uninsured depositors were protected under the systemic risk exception (S06); the cost falls on the DIF, which the FDI Act requires to be recovered by a special assessment on banks (S11); the joint statement said shareholders and certain unsecured debt holders would not be protected by the announced actions (S06).
  6. "The failure cost $20 billion" names one measure at one date, and the later figures are a different measure revised over time. The prior inventory and separately qualified retained relays report the FDIC's 26 March 2023 figure of about $20 billion as its estimate of the total cost of SVB's failure to the Deposit Insurance Fund (S07). The $16.3 billion in the November 2023 final rule is a different measure: the estimated cost attributable to protecting uninsured depositors at SVB and Signature together (S11). The $20.4 billion in the FDIC's February 2024 notice is the same two-bank measure revised, as is the $19.2 billion estimate as of 31 March 2024 and the roughly $16.7 billion estimate as of 30 September 2025 (S12, S18). The original S07 announcement remains unretained; S10/S13 are retained relays, not replacement copies. The March 31 point remains prior web-reading of distinct Columbia 2024 and 2025 Form 10-K filings; neither filing has exact retained bytes in this pull. The September 2025 estimate appears in the retained December 19, 2025 GovInfo publication of the Federal Register rule (90 FR 59370). The requested FDIC board PDF remains unretained; the retained GovInfo publication is a separately identified representation, not a replacement copy of that board PDF. Two measures; one of them is a dated series. "Three scopes" is wrong.
  7. "The Fed's stress tests failed" misstates the regime. Under the 2019 tailoring framework SVB was not subject to the supervisory stress test at the time; the Fed's review discusses tailoring as a contributing factor (S01). Whether a stress test would have caught the exposure is a counterfactual, not a record.
  8. "Regulators did not know" is contradicted by the Fed's own review. The bank had 31 open supervisory findings at failure, about three times its peers (S01). "Knew and did not act forcefully enough" is the review's own formulation.
  9. The Fed's review is a self-assessment, and others read the released materials differently. The prior web-review inventory describes different conclusions in the Bank Policy Institute's analysis of released examination materials (S14). That article was not retained in this pull (HTTP 202); its detailed position remains a prior-reading pointer, not independently verified from a retained body here. The two are not symmetric: the Fed had internal access and is reviewing itself; BPI is a bank-industry policy and advocacy organization reading released material and acknowledging material it could not see. Attribute both, evaluate at claim level, and do not present coexistence as equal evidential support.
  10. "Uninsured deposits were 94 percent" needs a denominator. The 10-K reports estimated uninsured deposits in U.S. offices of $151.5 billion and foreign deposits of $13.9 billion not subject to any U.S. insurance regime (S02); the percentage depends on which deposit total is used and whether foreign deposits are counted.

Questions and evidence limits

  • C1 — Observable / chronology fact(provisional claim analysis)
  • C2 — Measurement / denominator claim(provisional claim analysis)
  • C3 — Action / regulatory-response claim(provisional claim analysis)
  • C4 — Carefully bounded quantitative claim(provisional claim analysis)
  • C5 — Contested / commonly compressed proposition(provisional claim analysis)

Analysis

SVB is the specimen for quantity semantics and supervisory status in a financial record. The record contains, as separate objects:

  • the bank's own disclosures of unrealized losses and uninsured deposits before the run;
  • a transaction loss, a one-day outflow, total deposits at three dates, and two Deposit Insurance Fund cost measures, one of them revised over time, all in dollars and all different things;
  • a state closure order citing both liquidity and solvency;
  • a statutory exception with its own recommendation memoranda and letters;
  • a supervisor's self-assessment, an inspector general's review, a state regulator's review, a GAO review, and an industry group's contrary reading of released examination materials, with different access and documentary roles;
  • a rulemaking that converted a loss estimate into an assessment.

The value is not deciding "run or insolvency" or "who is to blame". It is preserving: quantity

  • accounting basis (amortized cost, fair value, realized, unrealized)
  • entity (bank, holding company, bridge bank, acquirer)
  • date
  • issuer and posture of the document
  • what each figure can and cannot establish.

Questions in the research record

  • C-1 — $175.4 billion vs $119 billion vs $56.5 billion (deposits)
  • C-2 — $209 billion (FDIC) vs holding-company totals (10-K)
  • C-3 — $20 billion vs $16.3 billion vs $20.4 billion (DIF cost)
  • C-4 — "Insolvency" (DFPI) vs "liquidity" (run narrative)
  • C-5 — Unrealized HTM loss vs realized AFS loss
  • C-6 — Fed self-assessment vs BPI reading
  • C-7 — "Regulators didn't know" vs 31 open findings
  • C-8 — "Taxpayer bailout" vs special assessment
  • C-9 — Uninsured share depends on denominator
  • C-10 — "Stress tests" vs the applicable regime

Why not?

Research account dated 2026-11-06. Descriptions of current or pending states refer to the recorded research date.

BEST "WHY NOT?" SPECIMEN

Popular formulation

"The SVB bailout cost taxpayers $20 billion."

Why not

Three different things are compressed. The $20 billion was the FDIC's March 2023 estimate of the total cost of the failure to the Deposit Insurance Fund, stated as provisional (S07). The joint statement announced protection of depositors through the systemic risk actions and said shareholders and certain unsecured debt holders would not be protected by those actions (S06). The FDI Act requires DIF losses from that protection to be recovered by a special assessment on banks; the final rule estimated that two-bank component at $16.3 billion (S11), and the estimate was later revised to $20.4 billion, $19.2 billion and about $16.7 billion (S12, S18). A final rule set a collection mechanism around an estimate; it did not fix the cost.

So: an estimate of cost to a fund is not a payment by taxpayers, and the March 2023 SVB-total estimate selected here is not the two-bank uninsured-depositor component (one measure, four selected dates).

Reopening condition

To assert a net fiscal cost, identify evidence of that cost after recoveries and assessments, with the entity, period and accounting basis specified. A cash transfer alone is not a final loss. An argument about indirect costs borne by customers or the public requires its own economic-incidence evidence and attribution. The selected records establish the announced protection and recovery mechanism; they do not establish every ultimate burden or a final net taxpayer cost.

Original basis: SVB-S06, SVB-S07, SVB-S11, SVB-S12 and SVB-S18; S07/S18 missing representations remain explicitly qualified and are not lead support.

Origin of this passage

Research dossier · E. BEST "WHY NOT?" SPECIMEN · lines 538–559

Artifact SHA-256: c86d2052ea049f9023179e5406a527cabeb857aa74be1120fd717eaced573e16

Attributed research text; this locator does not establish source support or standing.

SECOND "WHY NOT?" — CAUSE

Popular formulation

"SVB was perfectly solvent; it was just a bank run."

Why not

The chartering regulator's closure cited inadequate liquidity and insolvency (S04). The 10-K shows a $15.152 billion difference between net carrying value and fair value on the holding company's HTM portfolio at year-end (S02); comparing it with bank-level equity needs a reconciliation of entities, and the mark-to-market framing in the academic literature (S16) treats the difference as a solvency question. The order's own insolvency finding rests on the bank's inability to meet obligations after the run (S04, VERIFY wording), not on that argument. The run (S09) is real and so is the solvency language in the closure. The record does not require the reader to choose.

Counterpedia reveal Render the liquidity figures and the solvency statements as separate rows with their dates and bases, and let the reader see that both are in the record.

Reopening condition: A narrower solvency conclusion needs an explicit legal or valuation test, entity, date and source. Close the order’s wording against its exact representation or attribute a retained relay; do not substitute consolidated HTM arithmetic for a bank-specific legal finding.

Original basis: SVB-S02, SVB-S04, SVB-S09 and optional SVB-S16 at their stated research postures.

Origin of this passage

Research dossier · F. SECOND "WHY NOT?" — CAUSE · lines 565–578

Artifact SHA-256: c86d2052ea049f9023179e5406a527cabeb857aa74be1120fd717eaced573e16

Attributed research text; this locator does not establish source support or standing.

THIRD "WHY NOT?" — SUPERVISION

Popular formulation

"Regulators had no idea."

Why not

The Fed's review reports 31 open supervisory findings at failure, about three times peers, and characterizes the problem as insufficiently forceful action (S01). That count contradicts a categorical claim of no supervisory awareness. The Board's response to the OIG describes the OIG findings as reinforcing its internal review; retain that as the Board's characterization, separately from the OIG's findings (S13, Appendix B). The earlier review identifies BPI's different emphasis on supervisory focus and prioritization (S14, article body still unretained here). The reviews have overlapping evidence, different access and different documentary roles. Their coexistence does not establish equal support for each explanation of why the findings did not lead to effective action.

Reopening condition: A claim about a specific supervisory decision needs its dated finding, escalation, legal requirement and response. Retain the difference between the Federal Reserve’s internal review and BPI’s reading of released material; the latter’s missing selected body remains open.

Original basis: SVB-S01, SVB-S13 and SVB-S14.

Origin of this passage

Research dossier · G. THIRD "WHY NOT?" — SUPERVISION · lines 584–594

Artifact SHA-256: c86d2052ea049f9023179e5406a527cabeb857aa74be1120fd717eaced573e16

Attributed research text; this locator does not establish source support or standing.

Temporal bounds

Disclosure base: year-end 2022 (10-K filed February 2023). Failure week: 8–13 March 2023. Resolution: 26–27 March 2023 (First Citizens). Official reviews: 28 April 2023 (Fed, FDIC on Signature, GAO), 8 May 2023 (DFPI), 25 September 2023 (Fed OIG), January 2025 (GAO on the systemic risk exception). DIF cost estimates selected here: March 2023 through an estimate dated 30 September 2025, the latter published in December 2025 (S18). This is a historical selection, not a claim to contain the latest estimate as of the research date. S07 describes the provisional SVB-total estimate; S11/S18 separately describe the two-bank special-assessment component and its adjustment mechanism.

Sources

  1. SVB-S01 — Federal Reserve review of supervision and regulation — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (review led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr)
    source · research candidate
  2. SVB-S02 — SVB Financial Group Form 10-K for 2022 — SVB Financial Group (SEC CIK 719739)
    source · research candidate
  3. SVB-S03 — SVB Financial Group Form 8-K on the securities sale — SVB Financial Group
    source · research candidate
  4. SVB-S04 — DFPI closure and DFPI's own review — California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation
    source · research candidate
  5. SVB-S06 — Joint Statement and systemic risk exception documents — Department of the Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; FDIC
    source · research candidate
  6. SVB-S08 — First Citizens Form 8-K/A on the acquisition — First Citizens BancShares, Inc.
    source · research candidate
  7. SVB-S09 — Congressional testimony and hearing memoranda — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the retained prepared statement and Financial Stability Report; separately named congressional committees for the unretained hearing-material pointers.
    source · research candidate
  8. SVB-S10 — GAO preliminary review — U.S. Government Accountability Office
    source · research candidate
  9. SVB-S11 — FDIC special assessment final rule — FDIC
    source · research candidate
  10. SVB-S12 — Later DIF loss estimate (February 2024) — PNC Financial Services Group for the retained filing relaying the FDIC estimate; the separate original FDIC summary remains unretained.
    source · research candidate
  11. SVB-S13 — Federal Reserve OIG material loss review — Office of Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
    source · research candidate
  12. SVB-S14 — Bank Policy Institute reading of the released examination materials — Bank Policy Institute (a bank-industry policy, research and advocacy organization); authors Jeremy Newell and Pat Parkinson per a parallel review
    source · research candidate
  13. SVB-S15 — GAO review of the systemic risk exception — GAO
    source · research candidate
  14. SVB-S16 — Academic mark-to-market analysis — OPTIONAL — NBER Working Paper / SSRN, March 2023 — VERIFY identifier
    source · research candidate
Inspect

Research-basis references identify material in the underlying research dossier. They are not admitted Counterpedia claims, citations, or source bindings.

Research pack
demo-corpus-wave2
Artifact
silicon-valley-bank-demo-corpus-dossier-v0-2
Artifact kind
dossier
SHA-256
c86d2052ea049f9023179e5406a527cabeb857aa74be1120fd717eaced573e16
Standard
counterpedia.lead/v0.1
Research artifact
demo-corpus-wave2 / silicon-valley-bank-demo-corpus-dossier-v0-2
Artifact SHA-256
c86d2052ea04…
Sidecar state
current
Research basis
SVB-S02, SVB-S03, SVB-S09

Sources

18 research source candidates are carried by this entry, as authored in its research dossier. Each is a research candidate, not an admitted Counterpedia Source.

The dossier records an issuer for 16 of 18 and a date for 11; where it labels no issuer, the card says so. Addresses are shown as recorded. A recorded address is not a Counterpedia capture and does not establish retrieval, authenticity or support for any claim. A card links to a Counterpedia source page only where an accepted record relates a capture of an address recorded for that document to that public source; listing a candidate implies no other association.

Sources by recorded issuer

Select a candidate below to mark it for reading. Selection never changes the entry or its conclusions.

All 18 sources selected.

  1. Federal Reserve review of supervision and regulation

    Issuer
    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (review led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr)
    Date
    April 28, 2023

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 3 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    the primary federal supervisor's self-assessment; four stated takeaways (bank board and management failed to manage risks; supervisors did not fully appreciate the vulnerabilities; supervisors did not take forceful enough action; the tailoring approach and a shift in supervisory policy impeded effective supervision).
    Exact title
    Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank
    Date
    April 28, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S01
  2. SVB Financial Group Form 10-K for 2022

    Issuer
    SVB Financial Group (SEC CIK 719739)
    Report/auditor date
    February 24, 2023 in the retained filing. The earlier review located the filing date as February 24; VERIFY the exact SEC acceptance date against an EDGAR filing-index record, which is not retained in this pull

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    audited annual report of SVB Financial Group and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; the holding company's pre-failure disclosure, including bank activities.
    Exact title
    Form 10-K, Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022
    Report/auditor date
    February 24, 2023 in the retained filing. The earlier review located the filing date as February 24; VERIFY the exact SEC acceptance date against an EDGAR filing-index record, which is not retained in this pull
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S02
  3. SVB Financial Group Form 8-K on the securities sale

    Issuer
    SVB Financial Group

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 2 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    SEC filing; states that on March 8, 2023 the bank completed the sale of an AFS portfolio with book value of approximately $23.97 billion for net proceeds of approximately $21.45 billion, an after-tax loss of approximately $1.8 billion, to Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC at negotiated prices.
    Exact title
    Form 8-K, Current Report (date of earliest event reported: March 8, 2023; signed March 14, 2023 by the Chief Restructuring Officer)
    Related retained record
    March 8, 2023 strategic-actions presentation, Exhibit 99.2https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/719739/000119312523064680/d430920dex992.htm
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S03
  4. DFPI closure and DFPI's own review

    Issuer
    California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation
    Date
    May 8, 2023

    Open: Closure record

    More about this source · 2 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    chartering regulator's closure act and self-review. The possession order (dfpi.ca.gov, 10 March 2023) states its grounds; per a parallel review it links the insolvency finding to the bank's inability to pay its obligations after the run and describes the bank's preceding condition (VERIFY against the order's text at capture). Cite that rationale rather than the bare word.
    Exact title (review)
    Review of DFPI's Oversight and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank
    Closure record
    DFPI order taking possession of Silicon Valley Bank, March 10, 2023 (the earlier review reports inadequate liquidity and insolvency as grounds; VERIFY exact title and wording against the body). Exact order locatorhttps://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFPI-Orders-Silicon-Valley-Bank-03102023.pdf
    Date
    May 8, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S04
  5. FDIC press release PR-16-2023 (closure and DINB)

    Issuer
    FDIC
    Date
    March 10, 2023

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    receiver's announcement; states approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits as of December 31, 2022; the amount of uninsured deposits undetermined at closing; 17 branches; first FDIC-insured failure since October 2020.
    Exact title
    FDIC Creates a Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara to Protect Insured Depositors of Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara, California
    Date
    March 10, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S05
  6. Joint Statement and systemic risk exception documents

    Issuer
    Department of the Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; FDIC
    Date
    March 12, 2023, 6:15 p.m. EDT

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 4 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    the determination that all depositors would be protected; shareholders and certain unsecured debt holders not protected; losses to the DIF to be recovered by a special assessment on banks.
    Exact title
    Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC
    Date
    March 12, 2023, 6:15 p.m. EDT
    Supporting records
    Federal Reserve systemic-risk-exception letters (FOIA release)https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/systemic-risk-exception-letters-for-silicon-valley-bank-and-signature-bank.pdf
    Supporting records
    ; FDIC recommendation memorandum (FOIA release)https://fdic.gov/foia/systemic-risk-exception-recommendation-memorandum.pdf
    Supporting records
    ; CRS In Focus IF12378 (April 11, 2023)https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12378/IF12378.2.pdf
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S06
  7. FDIC press release PR-23-2023 (First Citizens P&A)

    Issuer
    FDIC
    Date
    March 26, 2023

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    resolution announcement; states that as of March 10, 2023 the bridge bank had approximately $167 billion in total assets and about $119 billion in total deposits; loss-share on commercial loans; the FDIC estimates the cost of the failure to the DIF at approximately $20 billion, with the exact cost determined when the receivership terminates.
    Exact title
    First–Citizens Bank & Trust Company, Raleigh, NC, to Assume All Deposits and Loans of Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., From the FDIC
    Date
    March 26, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S07
  8. First Citizens Form 8-K/A on the acquisition

    Issuer
    First Citizens BancShares, Inc.

    Open: Exact filing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    acquirer's amended SEC filing. Preserve the amendment identity rather than describing these retained bytes as the original March 27 report.
    Exact title
    Form 8-K/A, Current Report; the explanatory note identifies Amendment No. 1 to the original report filed March 27, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S08
  9. Congressional testimony and hearing memoranda

    Issuer
    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the retained prepared statement and Financial Stability Report; separately named congressional committees for the unretained hearing-material pointers.

    Open: Retained prepared statement

    More about this source · 4 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    prepared official testimony, a separate Federal Reserve report, and unretained committee materials. Preserve their distinct documentary roles.
    Retained prepared statement
    Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr, Bank Oversight, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 28, 2023https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/barr20230328a.htm
    Related retained official account
    Federal Reserve, Financial Stability Report, May 2023, leverage section, discussion of banking-sector developments near Figure Ahttps://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2023-may-financial-stability-report-leverage.htm
    Other research pointers
    Barr's March 29 House testimony; House Financial Services Committee hearing memoranda athttps://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-118-BA00-20230329-SD002.pdf
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S09
  10. GAO preliminary review

    Issuer
    U.S. Government Accountability Office
    Date
    April 28, 2023

    Open: Exact PDF

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    independent legislative-branch review.
    Exact title
    Bank Regulation: Preliminary Review of Agency Actions Related to March 2023 Bank Failures
    Report
    GAO-23-106736, verified on the retained PDF; its letter is dated April 28, 2023. GAO-23-106834 is related May 11, 2023 testimony located by the earlier review, not the document retained here
    Date
    April 28, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S10
  11. FDIC special assessment final rule

    Issuer
    FDIC

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 2 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    rulemaking; states that approximately $16.3 billion of the total cost of the SVB and Signature failures was attributable to protecting uninsured depositors, to be collected at a quarterly rate of 3.36 basis points on an assessment base excluding the first $5 billion of uninsured deposits.
    Exact title
    Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic Risk Determination (final rule, 12 CFR Part 327, RIN 3064-AF93)
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S11
  12. Later DIF loss estimate (February 2024)

    Issuer
    PNC Financial Services Group for the retained filing relaying the FDIC estimate; the separate original FDIC summary remains unretained.
    Date
    FDIC notice late February 2024; PNC filing 5 March 2024

    Open: Exact retained PNC filing

    More about this source · 2 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    an assessed bank's disclosure relaying a regulator's estimate; the measure is the same two-bank uninsured-depositor-protection measure as S11, not a new scope.
    Exact title
    PNC Financial Services Group Form 8-K (filed 5 March 2024) relaying the FDIC's late-February 2024 notification that the estimated loss attributable to protecting uninsured depositors at SVB and Signature was $20.4 billion, an increase of about $4.1 billion from the $16.3 billion in the final rule; the FDIC's own fourth-quarter 2023 financial summary carries the same estimate (VERIFY the FDIC document at capture)
    Date
    FDIC notice late February 2024; PNC filing 5 March 2024
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S12
  13. Federal Reserve OIG material loss review

    Issuer
    Office of Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
    Date
    September 25, 2023

    Open: Exact retained PDF

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    statutory material loss review by the independent inspector general. Appendix B, PDF page 48, contains the Board's September 14, 2023 response, which characterizes the OIG findings as reinforcing the internal April review. That is the Board's characterization within the response, not an additional independent OIG conclusion. The embedded-image page was visually inspected; a text-extraction miss would not establish absence.
    Exact title
    Material Loss Review of Silicon Valley Bank
    Report
    Evaluation Report 2023-SR-B-013
    Date
    September 25, 2023
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S13
  14. Bank Policy Institute reading of the released examination materials

    Issuer
    Bank Policy Institute (a bank-industry policy, research and advocacy organization); authors Jeremy Newell and Pat Parkinson per a parallel review
    Date
    8 May 2023 (per a parallel review; confirm at capture)

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    industry-association analysis of the released examination materials; reaches different conclusions about the composition of the 31 MRAs and MRIAs and the focus of supervision. It did not have the Fed's internal access and says some material was unavailable to it; the Fed's review is a self-assessment with that access. Neither fact settles the disagreement; both belong on the page.
    Exact title
    A Failure of Self-Examination: A Thorough Review of SVB's Exam Reports Yields Conclusions Very Different From Those in the Fed's Self-Assessment (confirm at capture)
    Date
    8 May 2023 (per a parallel review; confirm at capture)
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S14
  15. GAO review of the systemic risk exception

    Issuer
    GAO
    Date
    January 23, 2025 (Letter in the retained report)

    Open: Retained report

    More about this source · 2 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    statutory GAO review; records the six bases the FDIC and the Federal Reserve established for recommending the exception and states that how indicators would have performed without the exception is unclear. Footnote 35 relays a $19.2 billion estimate for uninsured-depositor protection at the two banks as of June 30, 2024, citing the FDIC's September 5 remarks. This retained June observation does not itself establish the March 31 observation in S18.
    Exact title
    Federal Deposit Insurance Act: Federal Agency Efforts to Identify and Mitigate Systemic Risk from the March 2023 Bank Failures
    Report
    GAO-25-107023
    Date
    January 23, 2025 (Letter in the retained report)
    Retained report
    ; separate highlights pointerhttps://gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107023-highlights.pdf
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S15
  16. Later points in the uninsured-depositor-protection estimate series

    Issuer
    Not labelled in the dossier.

    Open: March 31, 2024 estimate

    More about this source · 5 recorded addresses
    Role of this document
    regulator estimates of one defined measure at successive dates, sometimes relayed through an assessed bank's disclosure. The adjustment and collection provisions for this two-bank component are in S11 and the later rule, not supplied by S07's statement about the single SVB receivership. A final rule does not turn an estimated loss into a final cost.
    March 31, 2024 estimate
    Columbia Financial's 2025 Form 10-K explicitly relays the revision to $19.2 billion as of that date, in its deposit-insurance discussionhttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1723596/000172359626000010/clbk-20251231.htm
    March 31, 2024 estimate
    . This primary filing was web-read during the 2026-11-06 review; no body from that read is in the local source-pull archive. VERIFY its exact retained bytes before using it in a stamped lead. Official FDIC Q1 remarks are a separate locatorhttps://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2024/fdic-quarterly-banking-profile-first-quarter-2024
    September 30, 2025 estimate
    the retained December 19, 2025 Federal Register publication, Special Assessment Collection, gives $16.7 billion at PDF p. 2 / 90 FR 59370https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-19/pdf/2025-23425.pdf
    Separate November 7 public reading, retained as a distinction
    The #3276 research note records a Columbia Financial 2024 Form 10-K athttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1723596/000172359625000061/clbk-20241231.htm
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S18
  17. Academic mark-to-market analysis — OPTIONAL

    Issuer
    NBER Working Paper / SSRN, March 2023 — VERIFY identifier
    More about this source
    Role of this document
    academic working paper; the source of the widely repeated "insolvent on a mark-to-market basis" framing. Interpretation, not record.
    Exact title
    Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?
    Authors
    Erica Jiang, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S16
  18. Wikipedia comparison surface — OPTIONAL

    Issuer
    Not labelled in the dossier.

    Open: Landing

    More about this source · 1 recorded address
    Role of this document
    tertiary; comparison only.
    Technical details
    Research handle in the dossier
    SVB-S17
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DetailFederal Reserve review of supervision and regulationSVB Financial Group Form 10-K for 2022SVB Financial Group Form 8-K on the securities saleDFPI closure and DFPI's own reviewFDIC press release PR-16-2023 (closure and DINB)Joint Statement and systemic risk exception documentsFDIC press release PR-23-2023 (First Citizens P&A)First Citizens Form 8-K/A on the acquisitionCongressional testimony and hearing memorandaGAO preliminary reviewFDIC special assessment final ruleLater DIF loss estimate (February 2024)Federal Reserve OIG material loss reviewBank Policy Institute reading of the released examination materialsGAO review of the systemic risk exceptionLater points in the uninsured-depositor-protection estimate seriesAcademic mark-to-market analysis — OPTIONALWikipedia comparison surface — OPTIONAL
Recorded title
  • Exact titleReview of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank
  • Exact titleForm 10-K, Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022
  • Exact titleForm 8-K, Current Report (date of earliest event reported: March 8, 2023; signed March 14, 2023 by the Chief Restructuring Officer)
  • Exact title (review)Review of DFPI's Oversight and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank
  • Exact titleFDIC Creates a Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara to Protect Insured Depositors of Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara, California
  • Exact titleJoint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC
  • Exact titleFirst–Citizens Bank & Trust Company, Raleigh, NC, to Assume All Deposits and Loans of Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., From the FDIC
  • Exact titleForm 8-K/A, Current Report; the explanatory note identifies Amendment No. 1 to the original report filed March 27, 2023
Not supplied in this view.
  • Exact titleBank Regulation: Preliminary Review of Agency Actions Related to March 2023 Bank Failures
  • Exact titleSpecial Assessment Pursuant to Systemic Risk Determination (final rule, 12 CFR Part 327, RIN 3064-AF93)
  • Exact titlePNC Financial Services Group Form 8-K (filed 5 March 2024) relaying the FDIC's late-February 2024 notification that the estimated loss attributable to protecting uninsured depositors at SVB and Signature was $20.4 billion, an increase of about $4.1 billion from the $16.3 billion in the final rule; the FDIC's own fourth-quarter 2023 financial summary carries the same estimate (VERIFY the FDIC document at capture)
  • Exact titleMaterial Loss Review of Silicon Valley Bank
  • Exact titleA Failure of Self-Examination: A Thorough Review of SVB's Exam Reports Yields Conclusions Very Different From Those in the Fed's Self-Assessment (confirm at capture)
  • Exact titleFederal Deposit Insurance Act: Federal Agency Efforts to Identify and Mitigate Systemic Risk from the March 2023 Bank Failures
Not supplied in this view.
  • Exact titleMonetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?
Not supplied in this view.
Issuer / publisher
  • IssuerBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (review led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr)
  • IssuerSVB Financial Group (SEC CIK 719739)
  • IssuerSVB Financial Group
  • IssuerCalifornia Department of Financial Protection and Innovation
  • IssuerFDIC
  • IssuerDepartment of the Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; FDIC
  • IssuerFDIC
  • IssuerFirst Citizens BancShares, Inc.
  • IssuerBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the retained prepared statement and Financial Stability Report; separately named congressional committees for the unretained hearing-material pointers.
  • IssuerU.S. Government Accountability Office
  • IssuerFDIC
  • IssuerPNC Financial Services Group for the retained filing relaying the FDIC estimate; the separate original FDIC summary remains unretained.
  • IssuerOffice of Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
  • IssuerBank Policy Institute (a bank-industry policy, research and advocacy organization); authors Jeremy Newell and Pat Parkinson per a parallel review
  • IssuerGAO
Not supplied in this view.
  • IssuerNBER Working Paper / SSRN, March 2023 — VERIFY identifier
Not supplied in this view.
Documentary role
  • Authority / posturethe primary federal supervisor's self-assessment; four stated takeaways (bank board and management failed to manage risks; supervisors did not fully appreciate the vulnerabilities; supervisors did not take forceful enough action; the tailoring approach and a shift in supervisory policy impeded effective supervision).
  • Authority / postureaudited annual report of SVB Financial Group and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; the holding company's pre-failure disclosure, including bank activities.
  • Authority / postureSEC filing; states that on March 8, 2023 the bank completed the sale of an AFS portfolio with book value of approximately $23.97 billion for net proceeds of approximately $21.45 billion, an after-tax loss of approximately $1.8 billion, to Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC at negotiated prices.
  • Authority / posturechartering regulator's closure act and self-review. The possession order (dfpi.ca.gov, 10 March 2023) states its grounds; per a parallel review it links the insolvency finding to the bank's inability to pay its obligations after the run and describes the bank's preceding condition (VERIFY against the order's text at capture). Cite that rationale rather than the bare word.
  • Authority / posturereceiver's announcement; states approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits as of December 31, 2022; the amount of uninsured deposits undetermined at closing; 17 branches; first FDIC-insured failure since October 2020.
  • Authority / posturethe determination that all depositors would be protected; shareholders and certain unsecured debt holders not protected; losses to the DIF to be recovered by a special assessment on banks.
  • Authority / postureresolution announcement; states that as of March 10, 2023 the bridge bank had approximately $167 billion in total assets and about $119 billion in total deposits; loss-share on commercial loans; the FDIC estimates the cost of the failure to the DIF at approximately $20 billion, with the exact cost determined when the receivership terminates.
  • Authority / postureacquirer's amended SEC filing. Preserve the amendment identity rather than describing these retained bytes as the original March 27 report.
  • Authority / postureprepared official testimony, a separate Federal Reserve report, and unretained committee materials. Preserve their distinct documentary roles.
  • Authority / postureindependent legislative-branch review.
  • Authority / posturerulemaking; states that approximately $16.3 billion of the total cost of the SVB and Signature failures was attributable to protecting uninsured depositors, to be collected at a quarterly rate of 3.36 basis points on an assessment base excluding the first $5 billion of uninsured deposits.
  • Authority / posturean assessed bank's disclosure relaying a regulator's estimate; the measure is the same two-bank uninsured-depositor-protection measure as S11, not a new scope.
  • Authority / posturestatutory material loss review by the independent inspector general. Appendix B, PDF page 48, contains the Board's September 14, 2023 response, which characterizes the OIG findings as reinforcing the internal April review. That is the Board's characterization within the response, not an additional independent OIG conclusion. The embedded-image page was visually inspected; a text-extraction miss would not establish absence.
  • Authority / postureindustry-association analysis of the released examination materials; reaches different conclusions about the composition of the 31 MRAs and MRIAs and the focus of supervision. It did not have the Fed's internal access and says some material was unavailable to it; the Fed's review is a self-assessment with that access. Neither fact settles the disagreement; both belong on the page.
  • Authority / posturestatutory GAO review; records the six bases the FDIC and the Federal Reserve established for recommending the exception and states that how indicators would have performed without the exception is unclear. Footnote 35 relays a $19.2 billion estimate for uninsured-depositor protection at the two banks as of June 30, 2024, citing the FDIC's September 5 remarks. This retained June observation does not itself establish the March 31 observation in S18.
  • Authority / postureregulator estimates of one defined measure at successive dates, sometimes relayed through an assessed bank's disclosure. The adjustment and collection provisions for this two-bank component are in S11 and the later rule, not supplied by S07's statement about the single SVB receivership. A final rule does not turn an estimated loss into a final cost.
  • Authority / postureacademic working paper; the source of the widely repeated "insolvent on a mark-to-market basis" framing. Interpretation, not record.
  • Authority / posturetertiary; comparison only.
Recorded dates
  • DateApril 28, 2023
  • Report/auditor dateFebruary 24, 2023 in the retained filing. The earlier review located the filing date as February 24; VERIFY the exact SEC acceptance date against an EDGAR filing-index record, which is not retained in this pull
Not supplied in this view.
  • DateMay 8, 2023
  • DateMarch 10, 2023
  • DateMarch 12, 2023, 6:15 p.m. EDT
  • DateMarch 26, 2023
Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.
  • DateApril 28, 2023
Not supplied in this view.
  • DateFDIC notice late February 2024; PNC filing 5 March 2024
  • DateSeptember 25, 2023
  • Date8 May 2023 (per a parallel review; confirm at capture)
  • DateJanuary 23, 2025 (Letter in the retained report)
Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.
Recorded identifiersNot supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.
  • ReportGAO-23-106736, verified on the retained PDF; its letter is dated April 28, 2023. GAO-23-106834 is related May 11, 2023 testimony located by the earlier review, not the document retained here
Not supplied in this view.Not supplied in this view.
  • ReportEvaluation Report 2023-SR-B-013
Not supplied in this view.
  • ReportGAO-25-107023
Not supplied in this view.
  • AuthorsErica Jiang, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru
Not supplied in this view.
Recorded locatorsNot supplied in this view.
Source status
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate
  • research candidate

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